Threat model
Map attackers, untrusted inputs, assets, trust boundaries and abuse paths.
Red-team a sandboxed agent, contain tool misuse and produce a prioritized remediation plan.
Map attackers, untrusted inputs, assets, trust boundaries and abuse paths.
Treat retrieved and tool-returned text as untrusted data, not instructions.
Limit reachable tools, parameters, resources, duration and side effects.
Defense requires layered input, output, policy and tool validation; no single filter is sufficient.
Record policy decisions and denied attempts, then define containment and credential rotation.
For every arrow, the engineer must name the data, identity, trust boundary, failure mode and evidence produced.
AI and documentation are allowed. The learner owns every generated artifact and must preserve the stated safety boundaries.
Symptom → impact → hypothesis → evidence → test → root cause → containment → correction → verification.
Create three autonomy tiers—recommend, approve-and-act, bounded automatic action—and define entry criteria for each.
Record the achieved L-level only from observed evidence. Course completion and certification do not automatically change the skill matrix.